We analyze the relationship between electoral systems and corruption in a large sample of contemporary democratic nations. Whereas previous studies have shown that closedlist proportional representation is associated with greater (perceived) corruption than open-list PR or majoritarian systems, we demonstrate that this relationship fails to hold once district magnitude is considered. The theory underlying our study draws on work on "the personal vote" that suggests that the incentives to amass resources -and perhaps even to do so illegally -increase with district magnitude in open-list settings but decrease in closed-list contexts. Extending this insight, we show that political corruption gets more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list PR (closed-list PR) systems. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold -our estimates are that this is as low as 15 -corruption is greater in open list than in closed list settings. Only at unusually small district magnitudes (those below 15) is closed-list PR associated with more corruption, as conventionally held. Our results hold for alternate measures of corruption, for different specifications of the country cases to be included, and regardless of whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary.
Why some political systems are more conductive to political corruption than others is a question of both empirical and normative importance. Corruption constitutes a drag on economic performance (Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Lambsdorff 1999) , and also reduces the legitimacy of government in the eyes of the governed (Seligson 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003) . It thus has major consequences for both economics and politics. When the proceeds of corrupt transactions are used to fund electoral competition, as appears to be the case in various advanced democratic nations, in which political competition is expensive and winning public office highly desirable, corruption is also corrosive of democratic accountability.
If elections are the mechanism that ensures accountability, then accountability is patently sabotaged when electoral campaigns are funded in part by monies raised through illegal activities.
Nor are illegal activities by public officials confined to the developing or transition economies, or merely incidental aspects of political life in developed countries. While the poor, often authoritarian countries of the world may suffer most from very frequent corrupt behaviors by public officials, we nonetheless observe a substantial range to perceived corruption even among the very richest democratic nations. For instance, the 1996 index of perceived corruption due to Transparency International (the Corruption Perceptions Index, or CPI ) 1 finds that countries with per capita GDP of greater than $10,000 US take values larger than 9 in countries like Denmark and New Zealand, indicating very little perceived corruption, but fall below 5 in countries like Spain and Italy, suggesting very widespread perceived corruption. Corruption does not necessarily evaporate with economic development, and, as the CPI index reveals, a substantial amount of corruption takes place even in some developed nations.
The substantial variation in the extent of corruption in democratic nations suggests that attention to the precise details of the electoral institutions themselves that are found in these countries may well be warranted, if we are to understand why public officials in some of them regularly engage in illegal behaviors whereas those in others apparently do not. In this paper, we study the effects of different electoral systems on the degree of corruption,
where, following what is by now standard usage, we define corruption as the illegal (mis)use of public office for private or party gain.
We investigate whether open-list proportional representation (PR) or closed-list PR is more conductive to corrupt activities. Most of today's democratic countries (45 of 79, according to data from the World Bank) use proportional electoral systems. Investigating the impact for political malfeasance of variations in how this system is implemented may prove substantively important for a large number of countries.
The literature on the personal vote has argued that politicians' incentives to amass (possibly illegal) resources to out-campaign their opponents during elections increase with district magnitude in open-list settings but that these incentives decrease in closed-list contexts (Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart, Ellis and Suominen 2003) . Building on this insight, we suggest that political corruption becomes more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list PR (closed-list PR) systems. Our analysis is conducted at two levels: cross-nationally, among the 40-odd democratic countries using proportional representation in the latter part of the 1990s, and subnationally, across Italy's 32 electoral districts over the eleven legislative periods that spanned the greater part of the second half of the twentieth century .
Our findings are remarkably consistent at both the cross-national and subnational levels, despite the fact that the measures of corruption we use at the two levels are necessarily quite different. The empirical evidence from the cross-national data analysis strongly corroborates our theory: political corruption becomes more (less) severe as district Our paper proceeds in four sections. We first briefly summarize the theories of the impact of electoral arrangements on corruption that we will examine empirically. We next present a cross-national empirical test and then a subnational (Italian) empirical test. A final section concludes.
I. Theories of the Impact of Electoral Systems on Corruption
We start with empirical implications drawn from the literature on the "personal vote" (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987) . The theory underlying the idea of the personal vote posits that in electoral systems where electoral competition takes the form of intraparty competition, the desire for public office gives candidates incentives to cultivate personal reputations, or reputations that distinguish them from the party labels with which they affiliate. Open-list PR, which allows voters some mechanism to select individual candidates off party lists, means these candidates need ways to differentiate themselves politically from their partisan compatriots. Hence, they seek to acquire personal reputations (Katz 1986 The type of electoral system is not the only factor affecting the extent to which candidates seek to acquire personal reputations distinguishing them from others running for office under the same party label. Carey and Shugart (1995) contend that where candidates of the same party compete electorally against each other -that is, in open-list environments -the extent of competitiveness tends to increase with the number of candidates, or with what is called district magnitude. The reasoning underlying this view is that "as the number of other copartisans from which a given candidate must distinguish herself grows, the importance of establishing a unique personal reputation, distinct from that of the party, also grows" (Carey and Shugart 1995: 430) .
We might think of this as a simple information problem for electors. In an open-list setting, candidates from the same party will have little difficulty gaining name recognition where there are few of them. However, as candidate numbers increase, so too does the need for the financial resources adequate to disseminate information to voters in order to achieve name recognition. By extension, Carey and Shugart (1995) Our argument is thus that corruption is an illegal variant of the search for the personal vote, which in its licit form typically involves the distribution of pork barrel, geographically targetable collective goods such as public works and infrastructure investments. Like pork barrel policies, corruption is geographically targetable; indeed, in many instances, corruption is even more targetable, because opportunities for corrupt exchanges are embedded in pork barrel politics and can be even directed at single firms (by permitting only pre-selected firms to win public tenders, for instance). Note, however, that the content of the exchange differs between the two: pork barrel politics are aimed at winning votes for individual candidates from constituents in the localities so targeted, whereas corrupt exchanges are aimed at extracting financial resources. For present purposes, this final distinction is not pertinent.
Rather, we emphasize that we see corruption as one likely by-product of the need to establish personal political reputations. Unlike Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2003), we expect that pork barrel politics and corruption to vary in tandem, as two facets of the search for the personal vote.
The hypotheses that we test in the following pages are thus two:
1) Corruption increases with district magnitude under open-list PR; 2) Corruption decreases with district magnitude under closed-list PR.
We use two empirical strategies to test these hypotheses. First, we analyze a widelyused cross-national measure of corruption perceptions based on surveys of businesspeople and others to study the relationship between open/closed list PR and the extent of corruption in countries that use proportional representation. Although activities identified in this dataset include both political and bureaucratic corruption, it is now commonly accepted that the two tend to go together, and that the CPI index constitutes an acceptable proxy for political corruption (Lambsdorff 1999). As a check on our findings using the TI index, we also undertake a parallel analysis using an alternate and arguably superior measure of corruption PR) will be greater (less) as district magnitude increases, and that suspected political corruption in Italy will therefore also rise with district magnitude. We now turn to the first of our empirical analyses, the cross-national investigation.
II. A Cross-National Investigation

II.1 Data
We begin our empirical analysis with a cross-national investigation of data on perceived corruption across 40-odd contemporary democratic nations. We build on the foundations established by Treisman (2000) , using the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) to study corruption cross-nationally. Later, we also report results using an alternate measure developed by the World Bank.
We collect information on the world's democratic countries that use proportional representation electoral systems, and we study how the extent of political corruption differs between open-list PR systems and closed-list PR. We also include a measure of district magnitude, and its interaction with our variable for list type (open or closed) to examine how district magnitude may condition and moderate the effect of electoral systems on corruption.
Finally, as we detail shortly, we include controls for the nature of the political system (presidential versus parliamentary) as well as for the other variables (such as level of economic development, religion, certain historical factors) that previous studies have identified as significantly contributing to corruption across nations.
We compile our data by first using Treisman's (2000) dataset from his canonical cross-national study of the determinants of corruption. We then incorporate the data on electoral systems and district magnitude from the Database on Political Institutions (DPI2000), documented in Beck et al. (2001) . 4 Since our conceptual focus is on the effect of different types of PR on corruption in a democratic setting, we exclude non-democratic countries from our dataset. To determine whether a country qualifies as a democracy, we rely on the Freedom House index, which classes countries as "free," "partly free," or "not free." 5 We include in our dataset all those countries that Freedom House ranks as "free" or "partly free" and that the DPI2000 accurately codes 6 as using PR 7 for 1996, 1997 and 1998, for a total of 43 countries. A few countries appear in the Freedom House index as "partly free" for only one or two of our three years, rendering their democratic status marginal. 8 For these countries, we turn to the Polity IV dataset to verify that Polity too classes four marginal nations as non-democratic. These countries were excluded from our dataset. One country 9 changed its electoral system from majoritarian to proportional during the three years we consider, and we also dropped it from the analysis. After dropping countries for the reasons just enumerated, we are left with an initial dataset of 42 nations.
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We choose to use information from the years 1996, 1997 and 1998 as the basis on which to construct our dataset largely because Treisman's (2000) dataset is coded for these years. Other studies (most notably for our purposes Gerring and Thacker (forthcoming)), also use data from the latter part of the 1990s. By confining our analysis to the same time period, we render it most comparable to these other investigations; to the extent that our results differ, it cannot be because of a slight alteration in the years considered. Because our results only partially corroborate a main finding reported in Gerring and Thacker (forthcoming), we particularly wanted to use data from the same years as they did, even if it meant our dataset would be slightly outdated. However, we doubt that our results would substantially alter were we to update the data (on either the dependent or independent variables) by two years to 2000, which is the most recent year for which it might be feasible to collect all the relevant data. Appendix A provides a description of the cross-national data used in this study, and descriptive statistics for the 42 democratic nations using PR that we include in our analysis.
II. 2. Empirical Results
Our procedure in the cross-national analysis is as follows. We begin with the largest, most inclusive dataset we could create for democratic countries using proportional representation. We then proceed in a series of steps, first dropping some questionable cases of mixed-member proportional electoral systems, and then dropping outlier countries with unusually large district magnitudes. At each step, we report parallel regression results, verifying that our basic argument is substantiated regardless of how we cut the data. We include important control variables at each step, and an alternative measure of corruption.
Finally, we also perform simulations aimed at generating intuitively meaningful and substantively interesting interpretations of our findings.
Our first step is to examine the statistical impact on the CPI index (averaged over 1996 through 1998 and rescaled so that higher values represent more corruption rather than the reverse) of the electoral system variable (OPEN), the district magnitude variable (DM) and the interaction term (OPENxDM), using OLS regression with robust standard errors to deal with the potential threat of heteroscedasticity among countries. As the results that are reported in Model 1 of 
whereas under closed-list PR systems the relationship between corruption and district magnitude is described by:
In other words, we can see that as district magnitude increases under open-list PR, corruption rises. Under closed-list PR arrangements, political corruption becomes less prevalent as district magnitude increases.
[ Table 1 Our initial dataset comprises all democracies that use PR and a few countries that use mixed member proportional systems (see footnote 7). We now drop these mixed cases and reestimate the model we just reported. Nonetheless, as the information reported in Model 5
in Table 1 shows, our results are substantially unaffected. The signs on all the variables remain unaltered, and the variables that were statistically significant in Model 4 retain their significance.
II. 3. Robustness Checks
How robust are our findings? We undertook two different types of sensitivity analyses: reestimating the model using a different measure of corruption, on the one hand, and dropping outliers, on the other. We report the findings of these additional regressions in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here] Models 6 and 7 report regression results when we use a World Bank indicator of perceptions of corruption (initially reported in Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón 1999).
As was the case in the regression results reported in Table 1 , we find here also that the effect of district magnitude on corruption is positive under open-list PR, whereas it is negative in a closed-list context, and this is true both for our initial set of countries, as we see from the results under Model 6, and after we drop the mixed-member proportional systems, as reported in Model 7.
The size of district magnitude varies very considerably among our countries, from a low of 2 to a high of 150 among the 42 countries in our initial dataset, with an average of 25
representatives per district. As we can see in Figure 2 , the distribution of district magnitude is highly right skewed, and there are several very notable outliers, such as the Netherlands, Slovakia, Israel and Peru. 12 This leads us to ask whether our results are driven by these outliers. We test whether our basic results continue to hold even if we drop the countries with unusually large electoral districts, and report the results as Models 8 and 9 in Table 2 .
The results again corroborate our earlier findings. In Model 8, we report results without the six outliers, using the CPI index as the measure of corruption. Once again, we find that the effect of district magnitude on corruption is positive under open-list PR, whereas it is negative in a closed-list context. Moreover, once we drop these outliers, we can get a much more realistic idea of the threshold at which the effect shifts. Figure 3 shows results using Clarify to graph the difference in the impact of the size of electoral districts on perceived corruption in closed-list compared with open-list environments. In the results 12 Some of these, such as Israel and the Netherlands, are countries whose "district" is the entire nation; others have simply established unusually large district boundaries.
depicted in Figure 1 , where we included the six outliers, we found that closed-list PR was more corrupt than its open-list counterpart when district magnitudes were smaller than 50.
Once we drop the six countries with exceptionally large district magnitudes, however, this becomes true for countries with district magnitudes as low as 15. At small district magnitudes, where fewer than 15 representatives are elected from each district, closed-list proportional representation is associated with more corruption than its open-list counterpart.
III. A Subnational (Italian) Investigation
The cross-national empirical evidence presented so far provides strong corroborative evidence for our argument. By estimating corruption across Italian electoral districts for the postwar era, we hold relatively constant a wide variety of factors that vary cross-nationally, including culture, language, legal tradition and institutions, and other aspects of the national political and party systems. This in especially useful if we have any suspicion that the choice of electoral system and/or district magnitude may itself be endogenous to government performance and policy outputs. Finally, the Italian case is especially useful because our measure of corruption exhibits a lot of variation -variation that on first blush appears mainly temporally determined (because so many more deputies were charged with malfeasance in the XI Legislature than in any previous period). 14 As far as we know, we are the first to note the significant relationship between district magnitude and allegations of corruption in postwar Italy.
III.1. Data
Using Italy's 32 electoral districts as the unit of analysis, 15 we measure political corruption in a given district as the number of charges lodged by the judiciary against members of the lower house of Parliament (the Chamber of Deputies) in each legislative period for all types of malfeasance except crimes of opinion. The latter includes libel, slander, and other similar charges easily provoked by behaviors that naturally occur during the course of electoral campaigns, but that is not likely therefore to be valid indicators of genuine corruption. 16 The charge we study take the form of official requests transmitted by the Ministry of Justice to the lower house to remove parliamentary immunity from the legislator(-s) named in the request in order to pursue judicial investigations and possible proceedings. These requests are called richieste di autorizzazione a procedure (commonly 14 District magnitude in Italy averages 20. In the XI Legislature, an average of more than seven deputies per district were charged with malfeasance, whereas the overall average for the entire period is only three and a half. 15 One of Italy's electoral districts (Valle d'Aosta) is effectively majoritarian rather than using PR. Because of this, and also because of data problems pertaining specifically to that district, we drop it from our analysis. 16 The remaining charges include corruption but also a wide variety of charges that suggest abuse of office. (1991), who studied the RAP lodged against members of Italy's upper house, the Senate; and Ricolfi (1993) , who analyzes all requests to remove parliamentary immunity from legislators from all parties during the XI Legislature (1992-94) . In the present study, we use data on (non-opinion) charges of criminal malfeasance against all members of all political parties in the first eleven postwar parliaments. 17 The nature of the charges is highly variable, running the gamut from speeding offenses to murder. Systematic data on the nature of charges for all the legislative periods we consider are not currently available, but in the XI Legislature, which has been analyzed in detail by Ricolfi (1991) , the most frequent of the 120 charges listed in the 540 RAP transmitted to both the Chamber and the Senate involved violations of the law on campaign financing, abuse of office, and corruption for "un atto contrario ai doveri di ufficio" (an act against one's official obligations) (p. 24). So while the RAP are not a perfect measure of suspected political corruption, they seem a reasonable (and analytically valuable) proxy
In what follows, we examine the relationship between district magnitude and the degree of alleged political corruption. If our theory is correct, then we should find more charges of malfeasance lodged against legislators from larger districts, all else equal. We introduce control variables for district wealth and education, which research on subnational determinants of corruption in other countries finds to be important. In addition, one common and potentially valid objection to the use of judicial records as a proxy for corruption is that they are likely to be influenced by the judicial efficiency (Seligson 2002) . Recognizing this potential threat, we use reasonable proxies to control for judicial activism and efficiency.
III.2 Empirical Analysis.
We first examine the judicial records of all members of Italy's Chamber of Deputies in the first eleven postwar legislatures (those elected between 1948 and 1992), and we aggregate these records to the level of electoral districts. In so doing, we compile a crosssectional (district) time-series (legislature) dataset, with the dependent variable the number deputies charged with corruption in a given district (CORRUPT), and the key independent variable district magnitude (MAG).
Figure 4 provides a visual summary of the relationship between these two variables.
As we can see from this figure, the upward trend of the lowess curve that summarizes the dependence of CORRUPT on MAG suggests that political corruption becomes more severe as district magnitude becomes larger.
[ Figure 4 about here]
To further our analysis, we now examine the relationship between corruption and district magnitude using a more systematic statistical technique. In a recent article, Zorn (2001) recommends the use of generalized estimating equations (GEE) to model non-continuous yet temporally dependent data. 19 Since CORRUPT is an event-count variable that is also likely to be temporally correlated (i.e. corruption might be sticky in some particular districts across time), we follow Zorn's suggestion and implement GEE to test our theory empirically. We choose a negative binomial distribution to entertain the possibility of overdispersion. Again, the key explanatory variable is MAG, and its coefficient is predicted to be positive.
As a first cut, we model CORRUPT as a function of MAG and whether the district is in the southern part of Italy (SOUTH), since it is commonly believed that corruption is greater in the southern half of Italy (cf. Putnam 1993) . 20 The results, reported in Model 10 of Table 3 , provide strong corroborative evidence for our theory. The coefficient on MAG is positive and highly significant, suggesting that suspected corruption is greater as district magnitude gets larger. The empirical evidence also confirms the conventional wisdom that political corruption tends to be higher in the southern part of Italy.
[ Table 3 about here]
To further account for variance across districts, we next follow the lead provided by Alt and Lassen (2003) , and include measures of district levels of wealth (WEALTH) and education (EDU). Alt and Lassen find these variables important in accounting for corruption in a cross-sectional study of US states. More generally, many have suggested that economic development and education reduce corruption (although cross-nationally, the relationship may be parabolic rather than linear, according to Montinola and Jackman 2002; cf. 19 Zorn posits that the GEE approach enables scholars to model correlated data in a variety of forms, such as binary, ordinal and event-count outcome variables. See Zorn (2001) . For a technical discussion of the GEE procedure, see Zeger and Liang (1986) . 20 South is defined in conventional fashion, encompassing all electoral districts from Rome down.
Huntington 1968). 21 Results of this expanded model are reported in Model 11 of Table 3.   22 As we can see, the coefficient of MAG remains positive and significant. For every 10 additional deputies elected, the number of charges almost doubles. Education, too, is strongly associated with the presence of legislators suspected of criminal wrongdoing; where the population is less well educated, and thus perhaps less capable of monitoring its elected officials, these officials are more likely to engage in alleged malfeasance. GDP per capita, finally, exhibits the expected sign (wealthier areas area associated with less suspected corruption) and is marginally significant. In this new specification, the variable SOUTH becomes statistically insignificant. A closer examination reveals that, in accordance with the conventional view, that southern electoral districts are significantly poorer than the northern areas. These combined results indicate that there is not something unexplained about the "south" that is associated with more corruption, but instead that suspected corruption is greater in southern Italy because its population has lower levels of education and economic development is less there.
In Model 12 of Table 3 , we next rerun the last model but remove the variable SOUTH. The results for district magnitude hardly change. Larger districts elect more political representatives who are subsequently charged with criminal activities. In Model 12, wealth as well as education now emerge as strongly associated with suspected legislative malfeasance. Poorer districts, and districts with populations who are less well educated, elect more legislators who engage in alleged wrongdoing.
III.3 Robustness Checks
21 It may also be the case that corruption inhibits economic development, thereby reducing wealth, but for the moment we ignore endogeneity issues. 22 Note that the data source that yields these two variables does not cover the first two and the last legislature. Consequently, the number of observations drops substantially from 339 to 250.
As discussed above, one might object to the use of judicial records as a proxy for corruption, since these are a measure of the energy and activism of judicial enforcement as well as a reflection of the underlying level of corruption. To ensure that our results do not simply reflect a spurious relationship between corruption and judicial efficiency, we include two reasonable measures of judicial efficiency directly into the model specification. The first measure is the annual average length of civil trials in the lower courts, and the second is the annual ratio of completed judicial proceedings in civil cases to the total pending, again in the lower courts. These two measures are quickly becoming standard proxies for judicial efficiency in Italian regions (Bianco, Jappelli and Pagano forthcoming; Fabbi 2001; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2002) . If our measure of corruption were actually tapping judicial efficiency, we would find that as efficiency improves (indicated by shorter civil proceedings and increasing ratios of completed to pending proceedings every year), allegations lodged against deputies also increased.
We test our expectations in Model 13 and Model 14 respectively. 23 The results detailed in Table 4 reconfirm that larger electoral districts elect more allegedly corrupt politicians, as our main theory predicts. In addition, the coefficients for education, wealth, and judicial efficiency are all signed consistently with our expectations, but only the final variable is significant by conventional statistical standards. In areas where civil trials take longer and where the completion rate is low, more elected national politicians engage in suspected malfeasance. The impact is relatively small, but statistically, we can be quite confident that the relationship we observe is not due to chance.
23 Our data on judicial efficiency are not available for the period before 1970. Therefore, we are only able to include these two variables from the fifth legislature on. Consequently, the number of observations drops from 250 to 188.
Our interpretation of this finding is twofold. First, where the courts are less efficient, as indicated by the slow-moving trials for which Italy is notorious, politicians feel less threatened by the judiciary, and hence are more likely to engage in criminal activities. This aspect of our interpretation is straightforward. More subtly, however, and also of greater theoretical importance, our finding helps dispel doubts we might have entertained about the validity of our measure of political corruption, namely, the RAP. Because the RAP are a measure of judicial enforcement of corruption, rather than a direct measure of corruption itself, perhaps in the form of government output (as proposed by Golden and Picci 2004), we cannot know how well it captures the underlying phenomenon of interest. Perhaps more RAP are lodged in electoral districts where public prosecutors are more activist. Our finding that suspected political corruption is greater where trials take longer and the courts are less efficient -and by extension are presumably less activist as well -implies that the RAP are not likely to be products merely of judicial efficiency and activism per se. Rather, the RAP appear to be empirically independent of overall judicial efficiency.
[ Table 4 about here]
Finally, another possible objection to our analysis thus far is that larger electoral districts may elect more corrupt politicians simply because they elect more politicians. To handle this, we put the number of deputies charged in each district and each legislative period in relation to the number of legislators elected from the district, thereby effectively controlling for district size. This measure is equivalent to the percent of deputies charged with (non-opinion) malfeasance. At the same time, we also include a control for judicial efficiency.
Using this new measure as the dependent variable and repeating the model specified in Model 13 and Model 14, we reestimate the impact of district magnitude on corruption.
Note that we correct the problem of temporal correlation by including the lagged dependent variable among our regressors, and we report panel-corrected standard errors to guard against potential problems of panel heteroskedasticity across districts and contemporaneous correlation of errors (Beck and Katz 1995 Notes: Model 1 -Model 4 are based on the full sample. Model 5 drops mixed-member systems, including MMP and Taiwan. Robust standard errors in brackets. *significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Lowess Curv e
